Beneath a Sacred Kenyan Hill, a Fight Over Minerals, Money and a New Global Scramble

On the southern Kenyan coast, where cassava fields and sugar cane give way to dense forest, a low volcanic hill has become an unlikely object of global competition. Mrima Hill does not look like a strategic asset. To the Digo people who live around it, the forested rise in Kwale County is a sacred kaya, a place of spiritual and cultural importance.

Beneath it, however, Kenyan geological surveys have identified niobium and rare-earth elements that are increasingly important to industries making high-strength steel, permanent magnets, electronics and defense equipment. The United States, China and Australian mining interests have taken notice, and Kenya’s government has begun the process of selecting a company to develop the deposit.

The political stakes became clear in September, when Rigathi Gachagua, Kenya’s former deputy president and now an opposition political figure, accused President William Ruto of preparing to give away the country’s mineral wealth. Speaking to Kenyans in Kansas City, Missouri, Gachagua said Ruto’s trip to the United States was partly intended to advance a deal concerning Mrima Hill’s niobium deposits, which he valued at about 8.2 trillion Kenyan shillings, or roughly $63 billion at current exchange rates. “His real mission in the United States is to come and seal a deal with Americans on how Niobium will be exploited from Kenya,” Gachagua said. He later said he was prepared to challenge such an arrangement in court.

Ruto responded angrily when asked about Gachagua’s allegations during a media engagement in Mombasa. “Usiniletee maneno ya mtu mjinga kama huyo tafadhali. Tuongee maneno mengine, yule ni mpuuzi sana yule (Let’s not discuss issues from an unreasonable person. Let’s discuss something else. He’s very ignorant),” he said, according to Kenyan media reports. But beneath the political exchange lies a more consequential question: what exactly does Kenya possess at Mrima Hill, what has Ruto actually agreed to with foreign governments and investors, and how much of the value being attached to the deposit could realistically accrue to Kenyans?

The answers are considerably more complicated than the headline figure suggests.

Kenya’s Ministry of Mining has classified niobium and rare-earth elements as strategic minerals and is seeking a developer through a competitive tender. Its March 2026 project documentation says the Mrima Hill prospect covers about 31.9 square kilometres and contains indicated resources of 5.8 million tonnes grading 1.41% niobium oxide and 48.7 million tonnes grading 4.4% total rare-earth oxides. It also lists inferred resources of 17.5 million tonnes grading 1.41% niobium oxide and 110.7 million tonnes grading 5.61% total rare-earth oxides.

Those numbers describe geological resources, not a pile of saleable metal waiting beneath the hill. The distinction is critical. An exploration-stage resource must still pass through detailed drilling, metallurgical testing, mine planning, environmental assessment, financing and construction before it can become a commercial operation. The Kenyan government itself has acknowledged that it needs a developer with the financial and technical capacity to undertake detailed exploration and mine development, and its tender requires bidders to demonstrate experience in processing niobium and rare earths and an ability to build an on-site beneficiation plant.

The often-repeated $62 billion valuation therefore needs to be read as an estimate of the potential value of minerals in the ground rather than the amount of money Kenya could receive from a mining company. The figure is associated with historical assessments and has been repeatedly cited by governments, companies and news organizations, but it does not represent the net present value of a developed mine after extraction, processing, infrastructure, financing, taxes, royalties, environmental safeguards and recovery losses. Recent reporting by the Financial Times has similarly described the $62 billion figure as a valuation attributed to a former project developer rather than the value of a completed mining project.

The difference matters because Kenya remains a small mining economy despite its mineral potential. The U.S. Geological Survey says Kenya’s large-scale titanium producer at Kwale ceased mining in December 2024 after its ore reserves were depleted, leaving the country without its previous flagship large-scale titanium operation. In 2024 Kenya was the world’s fourth-largest producer of rutile, accounting for about 9% of global production, while soda ash remained another important mineral export.

Government data show the sector’s vulnerability. The value of Kenya’s mineral production fell from about $262 million in 2023 to $198 million in 2024, according to figures in the Kenya Yearbook, largely because of declining titanium output. That is a striking contrast with the billions of dollars now being attached to Mrima Hill and helps explain why the government sees critical minerals as an opportunity to transform an underdeveloped sector rather than simply expand existing mines.

Ruto has increasingly made that transformation part of his economic message. In June, during the G7 summit in Switzerland, he said that Kenya was close to concluding a critical-minerals agreement with the United States under which Kenyan minerals would be processed domestically. “We have agreed that the minerals will be processed in Kenya,” Ruto said, arguing that Africa should stop exporting raw materials for processing elsewhere. He said the proposed arrangement covered rare earths and other strategic minerals, including niobium, lithium, graphite, copper and nickel.

That statement was significant, but it should not be confused with a completed mining concession for Mrima Hill. As of September, U.S. officials were still describing the relationship in terms of assistance for developing Kenya’s critical-minerals processing industry, while Kenyan Mining Cabinet Secretary Hassan Joho told Semafor that talks on refineries and processing plants were at a “very advanced” stage. There’s no update provided on the formal minerals agreement Ruto had said was nearing completion.

Meanwhile, Kenya has been conducting a competitive process for the actual mineral rights. The Ministry of Mining invited expressions of interest for Mrima Hill in March, requiring bidders to demonstrate expertise in specialty minerals, sufficient financing, technical capacity and experience in both underground and surface mining. The ministry also requires the successful bidder to have the ability to design and commission an on-site processing and beneficiation plant.

Seven consortiums were shortlisted during the process, according to the Financial Times, with American, Chinese and Australian interests among those competing. An Australian consortium involving RareX and Iluka, a U.S.-linked group involving ReElement, and Chinese interests were among the companies reported to have expressed interest. The competition reflects a larger geopolitical shift: governments that once regarded mineral extraction primarily as a commercial question now see deposits such as Mrima Hill as part of national-security supply chains.

Niobium helps explain why. The metal is used principally to strengthen steel, allowing manufacturers to produce high-strength, lighter materials used in pipelines, transportation, construction and other industrial applications. Rare-earth elements have an even broader strategic role because certain rare earths are essential to high-performance permanent magnets used in electric motors, wind turbines, electronics and defense systems. Kenya’s own project documents describe growing demand for high-strength and lightweight steel as an opportunity for niobium, while noting the importance of rare earths to advanced technologies.

The timing is important because China dominates many stages of the global rare-earth supply chain. Beijing has increasingly used export controls on strategic minerals and processing technologies, while Washington has sought alternative sources in Africa, Australia and elsewhere. The G7 agreed in June to strengthen cooperation on critical-mineral supply chains, including coordinated stockpiling and a greater role for the International Energy Agency, as Western governments seek to reduce dependence on China.

For Kenya, that geopolitical competition creates bargaining power, but it also creates risks. The country can invite competing investors and demand local processing, technology transfer and jobs rather than simply granting access to ore. But a deposit is valuable only if Kenya can convert geological potential into commercially recoverable minerals while maintaining enough negotiating capacity to capture a meaningful share of the resulting value.

The Ruto administration has already tried to construct that framework through agreements with foreign investors. In April 2024, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates signed an investment memorandum covering mining alongside other sectors, within a broader investment framework worth up to $500 million. The mining component envisaged cooperation in mineral exploration, mine development, processing, refining and marketing, as well as technology transfer.

The UAE agreement illustrates an important distinction from the current Mrima Hill controversy. It was an investment framework rather than a publicly disclosed transfer of ownership of a particular mineral deposit. Likewise, Ruto’s announcement concerning the United States has so far described a framework for critical-mineral cooperation and domestic processing rather than a public contract assigning the Mrima Hill resource to an American company. The government is still running the tender through which mineral rights are to be awarded.

There are other pieces of the government’s mining strategy. In February 2024, the government signed a $37 million contract with Soy-Fujax to revive fluorspar mining in Elgeyo Marakwet, according to the Kenya News Agency. The project had been dormant for years after the collapse of Kenya Fluorspar, and the government presented the agreement as a way of restoring jobs and mineral revenues in the Kerio Valley.

In western Kenya, Ruto’s government has also been promoting gold development. In November 2025, the president said a private investor was prepared to invest more than $1 billion in gold mining in Kakamega and that the government would build a gold refinery there at a cost of about $11.6 million. In 2026, Shanta Gold Kenya said it planned to invest about $510 million in its West Kenya gold project, covering exploration and development around Siaya and Kakamega.

These projects show what the government hopes mining can become: not simply a source of royalties but an industrial ecosystem involving exploration, extraction, refining, processing and exports. Ruto has repeatedly argued that Kenya has historically lost value by exporting raw commodities. In October 2025 he said that “For decades, we have exported our tea, our coffee, our livestock, our minerals, our cotton, our hides and skins, and even our fish in raw form only to import them back at a premium as finished products.”

The challenge is that value addition is expensive. Building a refinery or beneficiation plant requires electricity, water, transport infrastructure, skilled workers and long-term financing, while mineral-processing technologies can be highly specialized. A government can require local processing as a condition of a licence, but if the economics do not support that requirement, investors may either demand subsidies and tax concessions or walk away. Kenya has therefore offered substantial incentives, including investment allowances of up to 150%, tax-loss carry-forwards of up to 10 years and exemptions on some specialized mining equipment, according to the Ministry of Mining.

The government has also faced legal challenges over its mining reforms. A Kenyan court struck down regulations introduced as part of Ruto’s mining reforms, including proposed changes to royalty rates and licensing fees, after industry groups challenged the process and substance of the rules. The episode underscored the tension between Nairobi’s desire to attract large investors and the industry’s demand for predictable regulation.

At Mrima Hill, the questions extend beyond economics. The hill is culturally significant to the Digo community, and its geological characteristics present environmental complications. Academic research from the University of Nairobi found elevated concentrations of niobium and rare-earth-related elements in soils around the area and identified elevated background levels of thorium and uranium, concluding that Mrima Hill is a high-background-radiation area. Any future mining and processing project would therefore have to address not only land, water and forest impacts but potentially the management of radioactive material associated with thorium-bearing ores.

The community question may ultimately prove as important as the geopolitical one. International investors can compete for the mineral rights, Washington can offer financing and processing expertise, and Nairobi can negotiate royalties and local-content requirements, but a mine cannot operate indefinitely without the consent, compensation or participation of people living around it. The Financial Times reported that local residents have raised concerns about land ownership, livelihoods and the preservation of the Mrima Hill kaya, while community representatives have demanded greater transparency about how the project will affect them.

For Gachagua, the issue has become a political argument about sovereignty and the distribution of Kenya’s mineral wealth. For Ruto, it has become part of a broader attempt to reposition Kenya from a country that exports relatively modest quantities of raw minerals into one that participates in the processing and manufacturing chains built around them. Neither argument changes the geological reality: Mrima Hill is promising, but it is not yet a producing mine, and the $62 billion number is not money sitting beneath the ground waiting to be collected.

The more consequential test will therefore come after the political arguments have subsided, when the successful developer has to establish exactly how much niobium and rare earth material can be recovered, how much it will cost to process it, who will finance the infrastructure, what royalties and taxes Kenya will receive, how much processing will actually take place domestically, and how the Digo community will share in the resulting economic activity.

That is where the difference between a mineral deposit and a national fortune will be decided. Kenya’s government has an opportunity to use competition among the United States, China, Australia and other investors to negotiate better terms, but the value of that opportunity is not anchored on the headline number attached to Mrima Hill but on the contracts, processing plants, tax receipts, jobs, environmental protections and community benefits that can be built around it.

Brenda Fassie (South Africa)

Most Famous Song: “Vuli Ndlela”

Short Bio: Brenda Fassie (1964-2004), often called the “Queen of African Pop” or “Madonna of the Townships,” was
a South African singer, songwriter, and dancer. She was celebrated for her powerful voice, energetic stage presence, and candid lyrics that often reflected the realities of township life during apartheid.

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