Nigeria Has What It Takes to Combat Ebola, but It Must Act Fast

Nigeria has faced Ebola before, and it knows what it takes to stop the disease from becoming a national catastrophe. But that experience is valuable only if the country acts early, invests in preparedness and refuses to wait until an outbreak becomes difficult to contain before mobilising its resources.

The renewed threat of Ebola across Africa and particularly the recent discovery of a new Ebola case in Abuja should serve as a warning to Nigerian authorities. The country’s population, international travel connections and already stretched healthcare infrastructure make complacency particularly dangerous. Although Nigeria has demonstrated that it can contain Ebola, past success should not be mistaken for immunity from current and future outbreaks.

Nigeria’s experience in 2014 remains one of the strongest examples of what determined public health action can achieve. After an infected Liberian-American diplomat, Patrick Sawyer, arrived in Lagos, the virus entered one of Africa’s most densely populated cities. Given Lagos’s size, mobility and international connections, the circumstances could easily have produced a much larger outbreak.

Instead, Nigeria contained the transmission through rapid identification of contacts, intensive monitoring, effective isolation, coordinated public health communication and the deployment of trained personnel. The World Health Organization declared Nigeria free of Ebola transmission in October 2014. Twenty cases, including eight deaths, were recorded.

That outcome was not accidental. It reflected the work of public health officials, epidemiologists, laboratory personnel, emergency responders and other professionals who recognised that time was critical. The experience also demonstrated that a country with limited resources could defeat a dangerous epidemic when its institutions worked together and decisive action followed the first warning signs.

Nigeria must preserve those lessons rather than assume that the same outcome is guaranteed today.

The experiences of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda offer important warnings about the consequences of delayed detection, gaps in surveillance and the difficulty of containing transmission once the virus reaches communities.

The DRC has endured repeated Ebola outbreaks over several decades. Its enormous territory, remote communities, insecurity in some affected areas, weak health infrastructure in certain locations and difficulties building public trust have repeatedly complicated containment efforts. These challenges have shown how quickly an outbreak can overwhelm local response capacity when detection, access to care and community cooperation are inadequate.

Uganda, too, has confronted Ebola outbreaks, including the recent 2026 outbreak which has demonstrated the importance of quickly identifying cases, tracing contacts, strengthening infection prevention in healthcare facilities and maintaining transparent communication with the public. It’s also exposed the danger of missing early cases and the potential for transmission before authorities fully understand the scale of an outbreak.

Nigeria should not interpret these experiences as evidence that either country failed to act. Both have developed substantial expertise in outbreak response, often under difficult circumstances. The more important lesson is that even experienced public health systems can face serious setbacks when surveillance is incomplete, cases go undetected or response measures do not reach communities quickly enough.

Nigeria must avoid repeating such vulnerabilities. It cannot afford to wait for a cluster of unexplained deaths, a hospital outbreak or widespread community transmission before treating the threat with urgency.

The first priority should be strengthening surveillance at Nigeria’s international entry points. Airports, seaports and land borders must have clear procedures for identifying and referring travellers who may have been exposed to Ebola. Health authorities should maintain current risk assessments based on outbreak locations and transmission patterns, rather than rely on indiscriminate screening that may create a false sense of security.

Temperature checks alone are insufficient because infected people may not yet have symptoms when they travel. Border personnel need training to recognise relevant travel and exposure histories, communicate suspected cases promptly and coordinate with public health teams. Any measures introduced should be evidence-based, proportionate and regularly reviewed.

Nigeria must also strengthen surveillance beyond its borders. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention should maintain active communication with the WHO, neighbouring countries, airlines and regional health agencies. Information about emerging outbreaks must translate into practical action: updated travel advisories, readiness assessments at designated hospitals, targeted screening where justified and rapid deployment of personnel when the risk increases.

Preparedness must extend into communities. State governments should ensure that disease surveillance officers can investigate unusual clusters of fever, unexplained deaths and other events that may warrant investigation. Laboratories need access to appropriate diagnostic capacity, while designated treatment facilities must have protective equipment, isolation arrangements and trained staff ready before cases arrive.

Equally important is protecting healthcare workers. In previous outbreaks across Africa, healthcare facilities have sometimes become sites of transmission when suspected patients were not identified promptly or infection prevention measures were inadequate. Nigerian hospitals must reinforce triage protocols, ensure that staff know how to handle suspected Ebola cases and maintain reliable supplies of protective equipment.

Public communication is another essential line of defence. Rumours, stigma and misinformation can discourage people from reporting symptoms or cooperating with contact tracers. Authorities must communicate clearly, acknowledge uncertainty where it exists and work with trusted community leaders, religious institutions and local media. Preparedness is not simply a government exercise; it depends on public confidence and cooperation.

The immediate response to the confirmed case must be comprehensive. Authorities have identified 44 contacts and begun monitoring them, but contact tracing must be exhaustive, timely and supported by adequate personnel. Investigators must establish the patient’s complete travel history, identify everyone who may have been exposed and ensure that contacts complete the required monitoring period. Healthcare workers who handled the patient before diagnosis must receive particular attention.

Nigeria must also be honest about the limits of its previous success. The 2014 outbreak was contained partly because the country mobilised expertise and resources rapidly. Maintaining that capacity requires sustained funding, regular training, functional laboratories and emergency response systems that remain operational between outbreaks. Preparedness cannot be improvised whenever a dangerous disease crosses the border.

The federal government should work with state governments to conduct readiness assessments immediately, identify weaknesses and correct them. Emergency stockpiles of protective equipment and essential medical supplies should be maintained, while response teams should conduct simulations to test how quickly suspected cases can be detected, transferred and investigated.

However, these measures must be proportionate to the actual risk. Blanket travel bans and indiscriminate restrictions could disrupt commerce, discourage cooperation and divert resources from interventions that demonstrably reduce transmission. The objective should be to detect infection early, prevent further transmission and protect the public without generating unnecessary panic.

Ultimately, Nigeria must approach this threat with urgency, discipline and transparency. It cannot prevent every infected traveller from entering the country, but it can reduce the likelihood that an imported case becomes a wider outbreak.

Ebola does not wait for governments to become ready. Nigeria must act now, because the cost of acting early is far lower than the human and economic cost of acting too late.

Salif Keita (Mali)

Most Famous Song: “Africa”

Short Bio: Salif Keita (born 1949) is a Malian singer-songwriter, often referred to as the “Golden Voice of Africa.” He is known for his unique fusion of traditional Malian music with elements of jazz, R&B, and other international genres. As an albino, he has faced discrimination and uses his platform to raise awareness and advocate for the rights of albinos.

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