South Sudan Is Unstable: How a Weak State Benefits the Ruling Elite

Salva Kiir, the president of South Sudan, met with then US president Barack Obama at the White House in 2011 to discuss the future of the newly independent state.

Officials seated at the table were eager to hear about the vision for the political stability of the new country. But when Obama asked Kiir about his plan, Kiir turned to his chief advisor for an answer.

In my view, Kiir has never – then, or since – had a vision or plan to unify the country. This view is informed by my decades of research on the country and on-the-ground experience. I am a professor of international relations and the author of a book on South Sudan’s politics. I also served as a country expert for the United States Agency for International Development’s assessment team in South Sudan.

What’s happened since independence in 2011 is that Kiir has financed a patronage network and put his political rivals at arm’s length by keeping the country undeveloped and its institutions weak. Through the years, he has relied on the support of his cabinet and a tribal base of followers (he is from the Dinka community) to sow deep distrust of the opposition.

I researched this dynamic of governance in South Sudan in a recent study. I found that the country’s leaders have devised four fundamental strategies to exploit instability.

These strategies are:

• delaying elections to evade accountability
• repressing any actors, such as civil society, that seek to unify the nation and modernise the state
• playing up the threat of rebellion from political rivals to sustain violence and project fear
• leaning on regional conflicts to hold on to power.

As a result, instability and division have shaped the country’s political system. This has been enabled by informal patronage networks, war and denial, but also through the behaviour and actions of a corrupt ruling elite.

Instability has allowed the elite to undermine the justice system and actively suppress efforts at reconciliation.

This highlights the need to place more power in regional and international actors to hold South Sudan’s leaders accountable, while empowering civil society to promote such accountability.

A troubled short history

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011.

Growing distrust among the country’s elites soon led to the outbreak of civil war between 2013 and 2015. The war resulted in nearly 400,000 deaths, with 2.3 million people fleeing to neighbouring countries.

Pressure from the UN and the United States saw warring parties agree to a peace deal in August 2015. However, tensions rose again in July 2016, leading to a fresh wave of violence.

In 2018, a new peace deal was signed, but it has yet to be fully implemented. Ensuing turmoil has led to implementation delays and exposed the country’s rampant corruption.

South Sudan is one of Africa’s poorest countries. Yet, it’s also ranked as the most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International. A recent report issued by the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found

The 2018 peace agreement led to the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity, and renewed hope that the country would work toward democracy, stability and the rule of law. Unlike the 2015 peace deal, which involved negotiations with a few parties, the 2018 agreement brought several more groups to the table.

But the country has yet to hold its first elections, adopt a permanent constitution, integrate the armed forces or establish a war crimes court. It remains a fragile country torn by violence and turmoil.

In March 2025, for instance, Kiir arrested his main rival and former vice-president Riek Machar. He accused Machar of planning a rebellion against the government. A few months later in September, Machar was accused of treason.

Relations between Kiir and Machar have been strained since 2013, derailing efforts to implement the peace deal that stopped a war pitting forces loyal to Kiir against those allied to Machar.

The strategies at play

Instability has become a favoured tool among elites for maintaining political power. The process of governing through instability relies on four political strategies.

First, Kiir has used instability to delay the implementation of key pillars of the 2018 peace agreement. In October 2024, Kiir announced the postponement of long-awaited elections to 2026. He warned that there was too much instability to hold peaceful elections. This delay did little to stem violence or instability. In fact, it simply afforded Kiir more time to stave off efforts to hold government elites accountable.

Second, the government has used the threat of political instability to downplay the need for justice and democracy. This threat became a tool for repressing civil society actors and justifying their exclusion from the peace process in 2018.

Third, instability fuels political uncertainty, giving the government space to stoke fears of rebellion whenever it suits its interests. Such fears have been repeatedly exploited in the power struggle between Kiir and Machar.

Lastly, an increase in regional instability has extended, and in some ways complicated, the state’s ability to govern through instability. On one hand, regional conflicts have forced Kiir to assume a diplomatic posture for managing conflicts in neighbouring countries, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. On the other hand, the spillover effects of war have hit South Sudan. Sudan’s civil war, for instance, has pushed South Sudan to the brink of renewed violence. A recent break in an oil pipeline linking the two countries has cut nearly 40% of South Sudan’s oil revenue.

The next steps

One way forward for South Sudan is to devise an effective strategy for succession in the country’s leadership.

Kiir, who has been in poor health, has taken steps toward a succession plan.

The president singlehandedly appointed Benjamin Bol Mel, his former advisor and money man, as an apparent successor in February 2025. He sacked two of his vice-presidents, Kuol Manyang Juuk and Daniel Awet Akot – the two main dissenting voices left in the government – in May 2025. Kiir then appointed his daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, to serve as a senior presidential envoy.

These decisions bypassed the ruling party’s procedures of appointing a successor, which require discussion and a vote on new appointees.

Kiir had argued that the 2018 peace agreement allowed him to appoint his own successor. However, allowing party procedure to determine the outcomes of a successor would be far more likely to calm tensions.

Moving beyond the dynamic of instability will also depend on the pressure placed on Kiir and other national elites by key international donors, and their continued support of civil society actors.

Neither option seems particularly possible at the moment. With civil war raging in Sudan and the US having dismantled the United States Agency for International Development (which provided nearly US$16 million in aid to civil society programmes in 2023), South Sudan’s fragility is unlikely to improve any time soon.

Steven C. Roach does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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