A special train left the Egyptian capital of Cairo for Aswan, a town close to the border with southern neighbour Sudan, in July 2025. The train, publicised by the Egyptian government as shiny, air-conditioned and free of charge, runs a weekly service. It is transporting Sudanese refugees who are willing to go back home. Sudan, however, has been in the midst of civil war since April 2023.
The train arrives in Aswan after around 12 hours. Travellers then continue via bus or ferry into Sudan. Little is known about what happens when travellers arrive in the country.
As at mid-2025, more than 190,000 Sudanese refugees had gone back home from Egypt. This is a five-fold increase in returns from 2024. Egypt hosts the largest number of Sudanese who have fled the war. More than 1.2 million Sudanese have crossed into Egypt since April 2023, making them the largest refugee community there.
The army-led Sudanese government – which regained control of Khartoum in March 2025 after losing the capital two years earlier – promotes return as part of its alleged efforts for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.
However, camouflaged behind Egypt’s voluntary return programme is a far more complex political reality, with refugees in the centre.
Initially, Egypt kept its borders relatively open, allowing women, children and older men to enter visa-free under a long-standing deal with Sudan.
As refugee numbers rose, however, new restrictions were imposed and brutally enforced from June 2023. These restrictions were codified in a new law adopted in 2024.
We have studied socio-political dynamics in Egypt and African refugee politics. In our view, while the voluntary return initiative is widely promoted by Egyptian and Sudanese authorities as a sign of solidarity and reconstruction, it masks a policy environment aimed at reducing the Sudanese population in Egypt.
Egypt has a contentious history of refugee protection. In recent years, refugees have faced hostile sentiments from host communities and rising xenophobia. Sudanese refugees in particular have been denied access to public spaces or rental property, and have faced physical violence.
The government’s response has focused on appeasing domestic audiences in the face of economic decline by providing external scapegoats. This does not bode well for the future of refugee protection in Egypt.
Countries often scapegoat refugees and other migrants to retain legitimacy with their own citizens, especially when there are pervasive inequalities that states cannot or will not bridge. This is the case in Egypt.
Egypt and Sudan’s shifting relations
Refugee hosting is never just a question of humanitarian or ethical protection measures. It is deeply embedded in domestic and external policy interests, as well as the global geopolitical context.
Egypt changed its open-border agreement with Sudan on 10 June 2023. It required all Sudanese to obtain visas before entry. Wait times stretched to two to three months, and an illicit market of visa “facilitators” sprang up, charging between US$1,500 and US$2,500 per person.
Egypt’s reception of displaced Sudanese took a more restrictive and controlling approach, including deportations. Its asylum law, passed in December 2024, formalises these harsh measures. Vague national security clauses enable status revocations and penalise the “illegal” entry of refugees.
Politically, Egypt has backed the Sudanese army as the cornerstone of stability. It backed Sudan’s October 2021 military coup and has aligned with the army in the ongoing civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
While the civil war continues to rage in many regions of Sudan, army-led forces have control of the centre and east of Sudan, supporting the push for the special train programme.
Additionally, Egypt has been a core beneficiary of European Union (EU) efforts to stop onward migration from Africa and the Center East to Europe. Though Egypt is no longer one of the most significant routes to Europe – this has shifted to Libya – Egyptians make up one of the largest national groups of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. With rising numbers of refugees in Egypt, the EU fears the situation could spiral.
To address this, Egypt signed a 7.4 billion euro (US$8.7 billion) deal with the EU in March 2024 to increase control of its (sea) borders and cooperate on returns from Europe. Thus, Egypt’s return of refugees to Sudan is in the EU’s interests.
Under such complicated settings, refugees become pawns. Egypt’s train, therefore, serves domestic policy interests of reducing Sudanese refugees, addresses the general hostile environment these refugees face and supports Cairo’s external policy interests.
What about the refugees?
When it comes to Sudan, the big question is whether states are violating a core tenet of refugee protection: the principle of non-refoulement. This states that countries cannot return refugees to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.
Many Sudanese may choose to return not because they’re hopeful but as a result of economic hardship in Egypt, uncertainty with regard to their legal status, and fear.
The UN Refugee Agency advances three “durable solutions” for the return of refugees:
- local integration, which is difficult in Egypt
- resettlement to a third country, which has become increasingly difficult in the current global environment. The US, for instance, suspended all its resettlement programmes in January 2025.
- returning voluntarily to the country of origin.
Where possible, states aim to return people – both refugees and other migrants – voluntarily. This is often done with the assistance of the International Organisation for Migration. However noble this process may be, migrants may still feel coerced.
Though army-controlled areas in Sudan like Khartoum, Sennar and El Gezira have seen relative calm, key conflict zones like Darfur and Kordofan are still actively contested. Humanitarian agencies caution that the ongoing violence undermines the voluntary nature of return.
What can be done
Usually after a conflict ends, the UN Refugee Agency draws up tripartite agreements with the countries of origin and asylum, and itself. This establishes the conditions for refugees to return and establishes proper reintegration programmes.
In the Egypt and Sudan case, however, it’s not clear who is financing the return train. Where is the tripartite agreement between Sudan, Egypt and the UN Refugee Agency? Is this even on the table given the continuing conflict in Sudan?
The trickiest part is what happens in the long run for those returning to conflict. This can amount to what scholars call “slow deportation”, where return, even when allegedly voluntary, undermines a serious commitment to refugee protection.
What Sudanese refugees need is not air-conditioned trains. Rather, they need protection of their full political, social and legal rights, as the world promised in the aftermath of the atrocities of the second world war in 1951.
Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).
Dina Wahba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
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